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Iraqi Kurdistan – the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East?
Krzysztof Strachota, Józef Lang
Against the backdrop of the ongoing dismantling of Islamic State (IS) and the preparations for 
the independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan scheduled for 25 September, Iraq as a whole 
is facing a new conflict which is likely to result in a thorough revision of the present balance of 
power in this part of the Middle East. A serious risk has emerged that the conflict may rapidly 
escalate, and its consequences may be more serious for the Middle East and Europe than the 
fight against Islamic State.
Iraq following the dismantling  
of Islamic State
The underlying reason for the change of the si-
tuation in northern Iraq has been the ongoing 
dismantling of Islamic State in the region which 
is being carried out by Iraqi government for-
ces supported by Shia militias (Hashd al-Shabi), 
Iranian forces and other actors, including the 
USA (mainly air operations) and Kurdish forces, 
Sunni units etc. The recapture on 9 July of Mo-
sul, one of IS’s capitals and Iraq’s second largest 
city, was a major breakthrough in the fight aga-
inst Islamic State1. At the same time in Syria, the 
operation to recapture Raqqa, the capital of IS, 
has been advancing. Both in Iraq and in Syria, 
Islamic State now controls only isolated points2 
and although it is certain that – just like in the 
past – IS will be able to reorganise itself quickly 
and rise again, the dismantling of its parastate 
structures is shaping a brand new political reali-
ty in the region.
1 For more see: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2017-07-12/consequences-recapturing-mo-
sul-islamic-state
2 Aside from Raqqa, these include four big cities inhabited 
by several hundred thousand people: in Iraq, Tal Afar to 
the west of Mosul, Hawija to the south-west of Kirkuk 
and Al-Qa’im close to the Syrian border; and in Syria, 
Deir ez-Zoz in the eastern part of the country. 
For Iraq, the dismantling of IS is tantamount to 
a political victory for the authorities in Baghdad. 
More generally, it means the victory by the Shia 
camp which – aside from the government forces 
– includes the increasingly stronger Shia militias, 
which are only formally dependent on the gover-
nment. Both the authorities in Baghdad and the 
Shia militias are largely dependent on, controlled 
by and strategically managed by Iran, and the-
ir success is mainly a success for Iran, achieved 
on a regional scale. One important consequen-
ce of the Shia forces recapturing northern Iraq 
is the apparently long-term elimination of the 
Arab Sunni camp as an actor in Iraqi politics. The 
process of marginalising the Sunnis has been 
ongoing since 2003. The deep leadership crisis 
within Iraqi Sunni groups which has been evident 
in recent years, coupled with mass-scale support 
from the Sunnis for IS (even if this support was 
forced) at present discredits this group as an ac-
tor on the Iraqi political scene and has resulted in 
a brutal pacification of the region (involving nu-
merous war crimes3) carried out mainly by Shia 
militias. It has also provoked refugee migrations, 
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which pose the risk of a durable shift in the con-
fessional structure of Iraq. Finally, it entails the 
risk of another wave of terrorism. At the same 
time, the marginalisation of Arab Sunnis is a stra-
tegic failure for Turkey. Since at least 2009 (and 
in particular since the Arab Spring), Turkey has 
attempted to fulfil its huge political ambitions in 
the region (Iraq, Syria) which it grounded preci-
sely on this group. 
The significant empowerment of the Shia 
camp in Iraq, the marginalisation of the Sun-
nis as an element to counterbalance/absorb 
Iraqi Shias across the country, and finally 
the dismantling of IS that will likely result in 
a temporary drop in the USA’s involvement in 
the region all pose a major threat to the very 
existence and development of the Kurdish 
autonomous region in Iraq (KRG, the acro-
nym for Kurdistan Regional Government). 
Since 2003, the KRG has been developing with 
some success (the process was not stopped by 
the Iraqi authorities’ curbing the KRG’s state 
budget subsidies in 2014, a move which went 
against the Iraqi constitution); it has continued 
to build its partner status in its relations with 
Baghdad, and has used the government’s failu-
res in its battle against IS as an opportunity to 
seize several disputed areas, Kirkuk in particular, 
and to take over several oil fields (in 2014 and 
2017). Another important factor solidifying the 
autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan is its close econo-
mic and political cooperation with Turkey. Unli-
ke the terrorist anti-Turkish  Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party – PKK (which is also active in Syria under 
the name of the PYD), the Kurdistan Democra-
tic Party (PDK) under Masoud Barzani, which at 
present rules Iraqi Kurdistan, is Ankara’s ‘junior 
partner’. It profits from economic cooperation 
with Turkey and enjoys military4 and political5 
support from Turkey.
At present, the KRG leadership is aware of the 
rise in Baghdad’s power and its readiness to 
limit/dissolve the Kurdish autonomous region 
by all possible means (economic, political, and 
finally – similarly to the rest of the country – mi-
litary). In this situation, the authorities in Irbil 
decided to hold an independence referendum 
(scheduled for 25 September), and then to 
launch a quick process to gain independence 
which would be recognised internationally.
Iraqi Kurdistan ahead of the independ-
ence referendum
The referendum initiative was put forward by 
KRG’s President Masoud Barzani (who alongsi-
de his family has been the de facto leader of 
Iraq’s Kurds for decades). It is being implemen-
ted mainly via the structures of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party, whose leader he is. Accor-
ding to Kurds, the political motivation behind 
the referendum initiative is Baghdad’s striking 
and permanent failure to meet its constitu-
tional obligations towards the KRG6, which is 
another instance of Iraq’s century-long brutal 
violation of the rights of Kurds. Moreover, it 
is frequently emphasised that unlike Iraq the 
KRG is a stable, safe and (relatively) democra-
tic political organism which is free from inter-
nal conflicts, and as such is a much-desired 
element fostering the region’s stabilisation. 
The referendum itself is being prepared in an 
4 For example the Turkish military base in Bashiqa west 
of Irbil. From this base, Turkish forces provided artillery 
support to Kurdish Peshmerga fighting against IS, and 
trained Kurdish and Sunni forces. 
5 For example numerous visits by President Masoud Barzani 
and Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani to Turkey, includ-





6 For example in 2007, which was the deadline set in the 
constitution for holding a referendum regarding the dis-
puted areas (article 140 of the Iraqi constitution), includ-
ing Kirkuk; since 2014 Baghdad has no longer paid the 
subsidies due to the KRG’s budget.
A significant rise in the position of the 
Shia camp in Iraq poses a major threat to 
the existence and development of Iraqi 
Kurdistan.
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extremely hasty manner, and with awareness 
of organisational deficiencies: by late July 2017 
there was still no official confirmation as to 
the wording of the referendum question (most 
likely there will be one common question for 
the whole of the KRG regarding independence, 
with no separate question regarding the dispu-
ted areas and their official status as parts of 
Kurdistan or Iraq); other vague issues include 
polling stations, electoral committees and un-
biased/foreign observers etc. In line with the de-
cision by the authorities in Irbil, the referendum 
will be held regardless of all these problems, 
and will result in the process of negotiations 
with Baghdad being launched; this is planned 
to last between one year and 18 months, and 
to obligatorily culminate in Kurdistan declaring 
independence. Barzani’s team is decisively and 
credibly denying any pan-Kurdish ambitions on 
the part of Iraqi Kurdistan7.
The referendum has become the catalyst of 
a new phase of tensions within the KRG itself. 
Without openly denying the independence am-
bitions, the opposition parties (Goran and Is-
lamic parties) are against the referendum; the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is the 
second most influential party in the KRG, sees 
it as an opportunity to continue its political fi-
ght against the PDK. The reasons behind this 
objection are: the fear that the political sce-
ne may become completely dominated by the 
PDK, the referendum’s initiator; and the strong 
political and economic ties between Iran and 
7 There is strong awareness of real and deep differences 
between the Iraqi and the Turkish, the Iranian and the 
Syrian parts of Kurdistan, which rule out its unification. 
This concerns political and tribal differences, as well as 
linguistic (separate dialects written in different alpha-
bets), cultural and religious differences. 
the southern part of the KRG, which has been 
a traditional bastion of the PUK, Goran and 
other opposition forces. From Goran’s point 
of view, the formal condition for its support 
of the referendum is that parliament should 
resume its operation, which was suspended 
in 2015. Talks on this issue have been ongo-
ing; one solution may involve parliamentary 
and presidential elections announced in ear-
ly July and scheduled for 1 November 20178. 
Alongside the opposition’s political calcula-
tions, objections towards independence re-
sult from fears of a new conflict and a further 
deterioration in living standards (these have 
deteriorated due to the halt in federal subsi-
dies, the drop in oil prices, the consequences 
of the fight against IS, including taking up to 
2 million refugees and internally displaced per-
sons into the KRG9; the independence option 
poses the risk of an economic blockade on the 
part of Iran and Iraq which would affect the so-
uthern part of the Kurdish autonomous region 
in particular). Taking account of all these circu-
mstances, it is assumed that the vast majority 
of Kurds will support Kurdistan’s independen-
ce10, with support likely to be the highest in the 
northern part of the Kurdish autonomous re-
gion (which is the bastion of the Barzanis, near 
to Turkey, and has weak links with Baghdad), 
and relatively lowest (although local experts 
still expect it to be as high as 60%) in the south 
(which has closer ties to Iran and Baghdad, and 
whose stronger political opposition is traditio-
nally linked to Iran).
8 http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/190720174
9 At present, according to official statistics the KRG is 
home to 233,000 refugees (mainly from Syria) and 
over 1.5 million internally displaced persons from Iraq. 




10 The upcoming referendum is not the first of its kind; in 
January 2005 a non-binding independence referendum 
was held in the KRG and in some of the disputed areas 
(at that time it was an element for putting pressure on 
Baghdad in connection with the work on the constitu-
tion), in which 98.88% of the voters voted in favour of 
independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Close economic, political and military 
cooperation with Turkey is an important 
factor strengthening the autonomy of 
Iraqi Kurdistan.
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The referendum and the risk 
of a regional conflict
The referendum project has met with sharp 
criticism from Baghdad and Tehran, moderate 
objection on the part of Turkey, and an extre-
mely restrained reaction from Western states 
and Russia, which officially support Iraq’s unity. 
In the case of Western states this reaction has 
mainly been motivated by their fear of Iraq’s 
destabilisation and bolstered by their dislike 
of secessionist tendencies as such, whereas in 
the case of Turkey the reaction was intended 
as an element of a bargaining strategy in its 
relations with Irbil (undoubtedly one compo-
nent of this strategy is Turkey’s willingness to 
ensure special rights for the Turkmen minority 
in Kirkuk). On the other hand, the attitude of 
Baghdad and Tehran equates with their readi-
ness to launch hostile actions targeting the 
authorities in Irbil. At present, these include 
attempts to politically discredit the referen-
dum initiative on the international stage and 
to fuel the political dispute within the KRG (by 
supporting the opposition). Irbil has to pay 
heed to the possible, Iranian-inspired increase 
in the escalation of tensions, as well as sabota-
ge, terrorist and military actions carried out by 
Islamic forces11, the PKK (which has a military 
presence in Qandil in north-eastern Kurdistan, 
11 Radical Islamic ideas, although they are relatively unpop-
ular, are present in the KRG; several hundred Kurds have 
fought in the ranks of IS, and Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish 
Salafi terrorist organisation, had previously fought against 
Peshmerga and American forces in Iraq. 
in Kirkuk and Sinjar)12, and also possibly by 
(a part of) the PUK forces13. What Irbil views as 
a potential option is the possible cooperation 
between Baghdad and the IS forces operating 
in the area around the city of Hawija (c. 20 km 
from Kirkuk); Baghdad is not only failing to 
take action against them, but is also suspected 
of providing them with arms, and intending to 
provoke them to attack Kirkuk in order to de-
stabilise the city and disrupt/discredit the refe-
rendum in a city of key importance for Kurds. 
In the present dynamic, a scenario involving 
Shia militias attacking the KRG seems likely 
(there have been numerous incidents between 
Peshmerga and Hashd al-Shabi), and may ulti-
mately lead to a conflict between Kurdish and 
Iraqi (possibly even Iranian) forces.
Despite their sharp awareness of the challen-
ges and risks connected with their ambitions 
for independence, the authorities in Irbil argue 
that the KRG/PDK abandoning the path to inde-
pendence should be ruled out; there is an awa-
reness of the opportunity escaping, combined 
with emotional self-assurance. The leadership 
of Iraqi Kurdistan believes that reaching a com-
promise with the opposition, the PUK in parti-
cular, is possible; moreover there is a widespre-
ad conviction that the Peshmerga are strong 
enough to defend themselves against Iraq, and 
that Kurdistan is an attractive refuge for reli-
gious minorities in Iraq. Against this backdrop, 
attempts are being made to create autonomo-
us administration units for religious minorities 
(Christians, Yazidis, Ahl-e Haqq)14, and also pos-
sibly for Sunnis in northern Iraq. So far, the KRG 
12 Although the PKK has officially expressed its support 
for the referendum initiative in the KRG, the KRG’s in-
dependence would in fact pose a threat to the PKK. Re-
lations between these groups are tense, and in Sinjar 
members of these two groups have even been involved 
in military clashes against each other. 
13 In the past, the rivalry between the PDK and the PUK had 
resulted in civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1994–1997. 
14 For example http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/43b35 
22c-32e1-413f-97d1-3f9bba16b10a/christians-support-ref-
erendum--want-autonomy-in-kurdistan
The attitude of Baghdad and Tehran 
towards the referendum in the KRG is tan-
tamount to their readiness to launch hos-
tile actions against the authorities in Irbil.
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has supported these groups forming militias 
to fight against IS; they could also potentially 
serve as a buffer in the conflict with Baghdad. 
Taking account of the unique nature of the cri-
sis in the Middle East and of Kurdistan itself, 
the present tensions pose a risk of increased 
involvement by external actors. Iran’s effective-
ness in strengthening its position in the region 
(including in Iraq), in a situation of political 
marginalisation and the ongoing radicalisation 
of the Sunni element, has triggered serious 
concern among Tehran’s regional opponents, 
from Israel and Saudi Arabia to Turkey. In prac-
tice, this would position them as potential allies 
of the authorities in Irbil. On the other hand, 
both the present conflicts in the region and 
the historical experiences of the Kurdish people 
themselves (including the Iraqi Kurds) suggest 
that the risk of effective management of in-
ternal tensions by all external actors is high. In 
this case – just like in the past – it can be assu-
med that openly pro-Baghdad and pro-Iranian 
forces may emerge among the Iraqi Kurds, or 
forces which would seek support from them to 
use in their own interest (paradoxically these 
could, for example, be religious/extreme Sunni 
Kurdish groups competing mainly with Kurdish 
nationalists).
Conclusions and prospects
The situation around Iraqi Kurdistan is very li-
kely to result in tensions within the KRG (along 
the north-south axis within the autonomous 
region), a sharp conflict between the KRG and 
Iraq (with special emphasis on Kirkuk), and fi-
nally a conflict which would involve various 
regional powers to varying degrees (Iran, Tur-
key, and also Israel and Saudi Arabia) as well 
as trans-regional powers (the USA, Russia). The 
ultimate stake in this conflict would be the in-
dependence of Iraqi Kurdistan, tantamount to 
a break-up of Iraq, vs. the dissolution of the 
Kurdish autonomous region and the reintegra-
tion of an Iraq which would be dominated by 
Shias/Iran. Either of these options would be 
a precedent of major importance for present 
and future conflicts in the Middle East. This 
conflict would be tantamount to an escalation 
of a proxy war between Iran and Turkey. In the 
eyes of both these states, Iraq (for Turkey Iraqi 
Kurdistan, which is its ally and client) embodies 
their greatest successes in Middle Eastern po-
litics, the stake in this conflict provokes the risk 
of escalation of actions on both sides. In the 
present situation, Baghdad/Tehran15 seems to 
be the decidedly stronger side; however, this is 
not an inevitable option for the future. Never-
theless, the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, the only 
manifestation of the processes of stabilisation 
and modernisation in recent decades, remains 
an open question, especially against the bac-
kdrop of its increasingly chaotic surrounding. 
It is highly likely that the USA (followed by its 
allies) will become involved in the conflict, since 
it is concerned by the region’s destabilisation, 
and in particular by Iran’s increasingly strong 
position. The USA’s increased involvement may 
result in greater involvement by Russia as well. 
Moscow intention would be not so much to 
back either of the parties to the conflict, but 
rather to demonstrate its role as a state able 
to manage the dynamics of such conflicts, and 
as a necessary participant in the process of re-
solving these conflicts. One factor which signi-
ficantly complicates the situation as a whole 
has been the fact that the challenges regarding 
15 For example, the successful marginalisation of Sunnis all 
over Iraq, successful regional initiatives; the ‘negative’, 
i.e. erosion-oriented plan towards Kurdistan. 
There are serious reasons prompting the 
view that a possible military conflict af-
fecting Iraqi Kurdistan would quickly flare 
up on a scale exceeding that of the civil 
war in Syria.
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the future of Iraq and Kurdistan form elements 
of a broader crisis affecting the Middle East as 
a whole. This crisis includes the civil wars in 
Syria and Yemen, and more generally the rivalry 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is most 
evident in the Persian Gulf region. The latter 
may potentially fuel tensions in Iraq itself16.
There are serious reasons prompting the view 
that a possible military conflict affecting Iraqi 
Kurdistan would quickly flare up on a scale ex-
ceeding that of the civil war in Syria. It should 
be noted that at present the Peshmerga for-
ces of the PDK and the PUK include more than 
240,000 soldiers, Hashd al-Shabi has around 
140,000 and the Iraqi army 270,000 declared, 
whereas the total number of troops presen-
tly involved in the war in Syria, including the 
government, opposition, Islamic and Kurdish 
etc. forces, is no more than 300,000 soldiers 
16 Including within the Shia camp itself, which is not ho-
mogenous, as evidenced by the visit by the Shia cleric 
and political leader Muqtada al-Sadr to Saudi Arabia in 
late July 2017 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/mid-
dle-east/2017/07/30/Muqtada-al-Sadr-in-Saudi-Arabia-
for-the-first-time-in-11-years-.html
and fighters. Should a conflict around the KRG 
emerge, an increase in the number and radicali-
sation of the armed forces should be expected, 
including the emergence of radical Sunni gro-
ups which in turn would pose a terrorist threat 
(just like in Syria and in the previous stages of 
the war in Iraq). Finally, similar to the conflict 
in Syria, there is a serious risk of a new phase 
of the migration crisis: the population of Iraqi 
Kurdistan is estimated at 5.3 million individuals, 
and the region also has more than 233,000 re-
fugees from Syria and 1.5 million Iraqi internally 
displaced persons (at present a return of these 
two groups to their homelands should be ruled 
out). In case of such a conflict, migration waves 
provoked both by crackdowns on the civil po-
pulation (carried out on a mass scale by Shia 
militias) and by the continued deterioration of 
living standards should be expected. 
